Abstract
Introduction
Access control is one of the most important aspects of network security. It has a significant impact on integrity and confidentiality and a considerable one on availability. Access control refers to the ability to permit or deny the use of an object (a passive entity, such as a system or file) by a subject (an active entity, such as an individual or process). A process is needed to support subject-based security policies, such as access based on competency, conflict-of-interest rules, or access based on a strict concept of least privilege. Supporting such policies with regard to the organizational structure requires the ability to restrict access based on a user function or role within the enterprise. Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) determines access rights that roles are associated with, and assigns users to roles. Users can access objects according to the roles which they currently occupy. The central functionality of RBAC is that access control policies for enterprise objects are written in terms of roles (i.e., collections of privileges), and each user in the environment is assigned to one or multiple appropriate roles. The major components of RBAC are roles, permissions, constraints and role-hierarchies [1] . A role is a function or part performed especially in a particular operation or process [2] . This role normally contains all rights needed for a specific job function. Users can be easily assigned to these roles or reassigned from one role to another, acquiring the roles' permissions. Constraints refer to requirements for enforcing Separation of Duties (SOD), least privilege, conflict of interest and classification [12] [14] . A hierarchy is mathematically a partial order defining a seniority relation between roles, whereby senior roles obtain the permissions of junior roles.
However, a junior role, or a role that is not included in the hierarchy, cannot perform the tasks of a senior role directly. In order to allow this when required, various role-based delegation models have been proposed to allow junior roles to be temporarily granted senior roles' permissions. The most common delegation types include user-to-machine, userto-user, and machine-to-machine delegation. A user-to-user delegation model called the Role-Based Delegation Model 2000 (RDM2000) [3] has been proposed to support role hierarchy and multi-step delegation. However, one challenge remains to be explored in RDM2000: In many cases, a delegating role member needs to delegate his or her permissions to more than one person simultaneously (indeed, to a role). For example, a professor may need to delegate his or her access right to a certain database to more than one of his or her research assistants at the same time. This type of delegation is referred to as the multiple delegation problem. The multiple delegation problem may be a big issue in a large-scale environment: existing delegation models can only handle a single delegation process one by one; if there are a large number of delegation processes that have to be operated simultaneously, these existing models are not efficient, especially if a large number of repeated delegations is required.
In this paper, a role-based delegation model called User-to-Role Delegation Model (URDM), which was proposed in [11] , is described and extended. URDM is an extension of RDM2000, which supports multiple delegation, role hierarchy, and single-step delegation. URDM has achieved both expressivity and performance improvements to solve this multiple delegation issue in RBAC.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives the background. Section 3 describes our motivation and related work. Section 4 presents the architecture of URDM including delegation and revocation. Section 5 demonstrates the design and implementation.
Section 6 discusses this new proposal. Section 7 concludes this paper and discusses directions for future research work in this area.
Background
Access control is what allows the certified user to access the inner information of a system within the limits of permission. Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) is a newer and alternative approach to Mandatory Access Control (MAC) and Discretionary Access Control (DAC) [4] . The components of RBAC are Users (U), Roles (R), Permissions (P), Sessions (S), Constraints (C), Users Assignment (UA) and Permissions Assignment (PA) [5] [6] . The relationship between these elements is shown in Figure 1 . U can be a human being or an automated agent, who use the system or an application program within the system. Assignment to roles is granted to users based on their obligation and responsibility in the system. The operation performed by a user can be carried out based on the user's role. R is a collection of functional responsibilities and authorities within the system. P is an approval of a mode of access to a resource. S is a mapping involving R, U and P. C is to specify restrictions on when the delegation or revocation process is valid.
Within an organization, the system administrator defines roles, a combination of obligation and authority in the organization, and assigns them to users. Roles are created for various job functions. The permission to perform certain operations ('permissions') is assigned to specific roles. Members of the staff (or other system users) are assigned particular roles, and through those role assignments acquire the permissions to perform particular system functions. 
Motivation and Related Work

Motivation
Delegation of authority is an important business rule related to RBAC policies. There exist two kinds of situations in which delegation is required [11] :
• Temporary role. When an individual is absent because of a business trip or some other reason, the job operations need to be maintained by others. This requires that somebody be delegated the authority to do the absent individual's job.
• Information sharing. In the same system or organization, because of task requirements, people need to get some access authority to share resources. Role-based delegation requires the delegating user to delegate his (her) role to a user who is a member of another role, so that this user can perform the delegating user's tasks. Delegation and extended access control policies are presented in [7] . The most common types of delegations include user-to-machine, user-to-user, and machine-to-machine delegation [8, 9] .
Barka and Sandhu have defined a set of characteristics related to delegation [8] Revocation refers to the process by which a delegating user can take away the privileges that he or she delegated to another user who is a member of another role, including cascading revocation, and grantdependency revocation. The goal of this paper is to propose a new delegation model capable of expressing the additional relationships needed for multiple delegation (expressivity), and be able to make delegation processes more efficient (performance). In this paper, expressivity means that users can give permissions to a role, without knowing in advance which individual(s) might occupy that role tomorrow. This paper focuses on user-to-role delegation, which is different from user-to-user delegation; especially a delegating user delegating his/her role to a set of users simultaneously (Multiple Delegation). We identified the major requirements of this user-to-role delegation: URDM supports multiple delegation, various constraints, monotonic delegation, total and partial delegation, self-acted delegation process, grantdependent revocation and bilateral agreement.
Related work
Delegation is an important factor of RBAC. ABDM [10] and RDM2000 are closely related to our model. ABDM is an attribute based delegation model with an extended delegation constraint. The delegation constraint in ABDM includes delegation attribute expression (DAE) and delegation prerequisite conditions. DAE is the delegation attribute expression associated with permission, and delegation prerequisite conditions mean all members of a regular role to be delegated. The delegated candidate must match the delegation constraint when assigned to a delegated role. This delegation constraint allows the delegating user to restrict the candidates for the delegated attributes more strictly. Our work borrows these constraints from ABDM to support role-based multiple delegation.
Figure 2. The development history of delegation models
RDM2000 is a user-to-user delegation model, which supports regular role delegation in a role hierarchy and multiple step delegation. A delegation path has been addressed to show an ordered list of user assignment relations generated through multiple-step delegation. RDM2000 uses the can_delegate condition with prerequisite roles to restrict the scope of delegation. Our framework is based on the RDM2000 model.
We have proposed the original architecture of URDM in [11] . In this paper, we expand URDM by considering four situations before multiple delegation occurs. A web-based system called University Delegation Management System (UDMS) is designed and implemented to verify the core functionality of URDM within the first situation. 
Architecture of URDM
We propose a delegation model called User-to-Role Delegation Model (URDM). Based on RDM2000 and ABDM, URDM supports multiple delegation, role hierarchy, and single-step delegation by defining a new delegation relation. This delegation relation makes our model more efficient in large-scale environments: existing delegation models can only handle a single delegation process one by one; URDM can achieve multiple delegations simultaneously.
Some assumptions are discussed before introducing the functional components in URDM. We consider multiple delegation to be the maximum delegation width, and multiple-step delegation to be the maximum delegation depth. The maximum delegation width can be also described as how many separate delegation processes are operated at the same level; the maximum delegation depth can be described as how many levels the delegation process can be operated further (see Figure 4 ) [11] . Delegation between users in the same role is not considered, because they already share the same permissions. There are two steps of user assignment in URDM: original user-to-role assignments and delegated user-to-role assignments: during an original user-role assignment step, the security officers take the administrative role. In a delegation step, a delegating user is to assign the delegated role to at least one delegated user in another role at one time. In this way, a single delegation can be considered as a special case of multiple delegation. To simplify our model, we consider only temporary delegation and single-step delegation in this paper. Figure 3 illustrates an example of organizational role hierarchy and related users in a department of a university [11] . This example will be used in the rest of the paper to clarify our model. Figure 3 (a) presents a role hierarchy in a school of information technology and engineering in a university. DIR is the senior-most role in this academic unit. There are two academic programs in this department: Software Engineering (SE) and Electronic Engineering (EE). Each program has a senior-most professor role (PROF 1 , PROF 2 ) and a junior-most research group role (RG 1 , RG 2 ). Two incompatible roles are between the above two roles: post-doctoral fellow (PDF 1 , PDF 2 ) and research assistant (RA 1 , RA 2 ). Figure 3 (b) presents users and their role memberships. Security officers assign these roles to users.
Basic architecture of URDM
The framework of URDM is shown in this section. It includes four parts, two of them are quoted from existing models, and the remaining ones are our new proposals:
• Basic elements with functionalities from RDM2000 • Two attribute expressions from ABDM • A new basic simultaneous delegation relation • Single delegation and single-step delegation 4.1.1. Basic elements with functionalities from RDM2000. We quote the following terms from RDM2000 to help create the basic architecture of URDM [3] .
Definition 1
• U, R, P and S are sets of users, roles, permissions, and sessions, respectively.
• UA ⊆ U × R is a many-to-many user to role assignment relation.
• PA ⊆ P × R is a many-to-many permission to role assignment relation.
• RH ⊆ R× R is a partially ordered role hierarchy.
• Sessions: U → 2 S is a function that maps a user to a set of sessions, where 2 S is standard set theory notation for the power set of S, the set of all subsets of the set S. Note that there are 2 |S| subsets of S; this function maps a user to one of these subsets.
• Roles: S → 2 R is a function that maps a session s to a set of roles.
• Permissions: S → 2 P is a function derived from PA mapping each session s i to a set of permissions where Permission (s i ) = {p| [( ∃ r' ≥ r)( p, r') ∈ PA, r'∈ Role(s i )]}.
• UAO ⊆ U × R is a many-to-many original user to role assignment relation.
• UAD ⊆ U × R is a many-to-many delegated user to role assignment relation.
• UA = UAO ∪ UAD.
• Users: R → 2 U is a function mapping each role to a set of users. DD refers to the maximum delegation depth. Because our model is used to consider temporary delegation, DT is the constraint that refers to temporary delegation limited by time. There are four important elements in a user-to-user delegation model: a delegating role, a delegating user, a delegated role, and a delegated user. Similarly, our URDM includes four elements as well: a delegating role, a delegating user, a delegated role, and a set of delegated users (indeed, a resulting role associated with a set of delegated permissions). A single delegated user becomes a special case of such a set of delegated users. We formalize the above description as follows: Definition 2 • current_users CU: a set of users in the delegated role after delegation, CU U.
• original_users OU: a set of users originally assigned to the delegated role before delegation, OU U, Users_O(r) OU .
• delegated_users DU: a set of users delegated to the delegated role, where DU U, Users_D(r) DU.
• CU = OU ∪ DU.
• PC: all members of a regular role to be delegated, DU ⊆ PC.
• DW: a number that refers to the maximum delegation width.
• DD: a number that refers to the maximum delegation depth.
• DAE: attribute expressions that refer to the delegation requirements for the delegated candidates.
• DT: a duration limitation for the delegation.
• SDR ⊆ UA × UA is a one-to-many delegation relation. This delegation relation can be expressed by ((u, r), (DU, r')) ∈ SDR.
• can_delegate ⊆ R × PC × {DW} × {DD} × DAE × DT.
Single delegation and single-step delegation.
Multiple delegation refers to how many separate delegations the delegating user has active at one time.
If the delegating user only delegates the role and/or permission to one single delegated user, this type of delegation is referred to as a single delegation, or a delegation with a delegation width of 1. Single delegation is a special case of multiple delegation. Multiple step delegation means how deep the delegation process will go from the original delegation user. In RDM2000, multiple step delegation is described as a delegation path. If the delegating user starts to delegate the role and/or permissions to a single delegated user u 1 , and there are no further delegations from u 1 , we refer to such delegation as a single-step delegation, or delegation with a delegation depth of 1. Single-step delegation is a special case of multiple step delegation.
If single delegation and single step delegation have a common delegating user and delegated user, then single delegation equals single-step delegation. We add the definitions below into URDM: Definition 3 • SD: single delegation, the maximum delegation width is 1.
• STD: single step delegation, the maximum delegation depth is 1.
• SD = STD, if SD and STD have the same delegating user and delegated user. In RBAC, permissions to perform certain operations are assigned to specific roles. Members of the staff (or other system users) are assigned particular roles, and through those role assignments acquire the permissions to perform particular system functions. There are four situations before multiple delegation occurs:
• Situation 1: The delegating user cannot delegate arbitrary subsets of permissions in a delegating role but can only delegate the entire role at a time to a set of delegated users, who are the members of the same role before delegation.
• Situation 2: The delegating user can delegate subsets of permissions in a delegating role at a time to a set of delegated users, who are the members of the same role before delegation.
• Situation 3: The delegating user can only delegate the entire role at a time to a set of delegated users, who are members of different roles before delegation.
• Situation 4: The delegating user can delegate subsets of permissions in a delegating role at a time to a set of delegated users, who are members of different roles before delegation.
Delegation in situation 1.
We add the following definitions when URDM is in situation 1.
Definition 4
• DAEs 1 : a set of attribute expressions that refers to the delegation requirements for the delegated candidates within the same role before delegation.
• can_delegate s1 ⊆ R × PC × {DW} × {DD} × DAEs 1 × DT. The meaning of (r, pc, dw, dd, dae s1 , dt) ∈ can_delegate s1 means a member of role r (or a role senior to r) can delegate role r (or a role junior to role r) to a set of other users who satisfy the prerequisite condition pc and dae s1 without exceeding the maximum delegation width dw, the maximum delegation depth dd, and duration constraint dt. In this paper, we assume that only single step delegation is considered; hence, dd=1. • SP: a subset of P, where SP ⊆ P; sp i ∈ SP, i∈ N.
• SDR' ⊆ UA × UA is a one-to-many delegation relation. This delegation relation can be expressed by ((u, r), (DU, r'<-{sp 1 
Delegation in situation 3.
Before delegation, the candidates are members of different roles. Successful candidates must match the delegation requirements. We propose the following definition.
Definition 6
• N 1 : the total number of delegated roles involved in the delegation process, i∈ N 1 .
• PC 1 : all memberships of a regular role to be delegated, where pc i ∈ PC 1 .
• DAEs 2 : a set of attribute expressions referring to the delegation requirements for delegated candidates with different delegated roles.
• DAEs 2 = {<r 1 , expr 1 , n 1 >, <r 2 , expr 2 , n 2 >, <r 3 , expr 3 , n 3 >… <r i , expr i , n i >}, where <r i , expr i , n i > means the number of successful candidates of Role r i who match the delegation requirements expr i is n i .
• DW 1 : a number that refers to the maximum delegation width, where dw 1 = n 1+ n 2+ … … + n i.
• delegated_users DU 1 : a set of users delegated to the delegated role, these users are members of different roles before delegation, DU 1 U,
• SDR ⊆ UA × UA is a one-to-many delegation relation. This delegation relation can be expressed by ((u, r), (DU 1 , r') ) ∈ SDR. The meaning of (r, pc i , dw 1 , dd, dae s2 , dt) ∈ can_delegate s2 is that a member of role r (or a role senior to r) can delegate role r (or a role junior to role r) to a set of other users who are members of different regular roles sdu i and satisfy the prerequisite condition pc i and dae s2 without exceeding the maximum delegation width dw 1 , the maximum delegation depth dd, and the duration constraint dt. In this paper, dd=1. Delegation attribute expression expr i is a delegation constraint. The delegated candidate must match the delegation constraint when assigned to a delegated role. This delegation constraint allows the delegating user to restrict the candidates for the delegated attributes more strictly. Let 
Revocation in URDM
In large-scale environments, URDM supports GrantDependent Revocation (GD). RAE is defined in URDM to be the set of attribute expressions for a revocation purpose. We also use the definitions in Definition 2 to represent a revoke delegation relation called can_revoke.
Definition 7
• RAE : a set of attribute expressions for revocation requirements.
• 
Design and implementation
We implemented the major functionalities of URDM using Dreamweaver 8. 
Application design and implementation
The example that has been defined in Figure 3 will continue to be used in this design. This web application is called a University Delegation Management System (UDMS). In order to secure the delegation process, only the authorized delegating users (professors) can login into UDMS. There are four roles in UDMS: a delegating role, namely Professors; a regular role before delegation, namely Research Assistants; a delegated role, namely PDF; and a pre-selectedcandidates role before delegation, namely SR. We implement these four roles as four corresponding tables in a database called Delegation Base. The following coding sets have been designed and implemented:
• Index.asp: a gateway to access the database.
• Delegation.asp: a multiple delegation process.
• DelegationResult.asp: a GUI for the result of delegation.
• Recovation.asp: a revocation process.
• RevocationResult.asp: a GUI for revocation result.
Because URDM supports self-acted delegation, we define that only the delegating user can log into UDMS and manage multiple delegation and grant-dependent revocation. To simplify our implementation, we define a single delegation attribute instead of multiple attributes during a multiple delegation process. Because we already assumed this is a single step delegation, a pre-condition called can_delegate is presented with four constraints: list of research assistants (PC), delegation attribute (DAE), two choices (DW) and delegation duration (DT). Delegation duration is used to match a field in the database called RASemester. During a revocation process, the delegating user selects a revocation candidate from all current users in the delegated role after delegation. This selection is based on a set of attribute expressions for revocation requirements.
A set of sample screen shots
The following screenshots are a set of sample displays of implementation results of a delegation operation. 
Discussion
Zhang, et al., [13] , proposed RDM2000 to support hierarchical roles and multiple step delegation. However, one important challenge remained in RDM2000: a delegating user may wish to delegate a set of permissions to all members of another role at the same time. This problem was identified as multiple delegation in [ Barka and Sandhu 2002] . As a new delegation model, URDM has achieved both expressivity and performance improvements to solve this multiple delegation issue in RBAC.
Conclusion and future work
RBAC, one of a variety of access control technologies, was created to make commercial security policies easier to manage. Like multi-level security, RBAC is conceptually simple: access to computer system objects is based on a user's role in an organization. However, a junior role, or a role that is not included in the hierarchy, cannot perform the tasks of a senior role. In order to allow this when required, various delegation models have been proposed to allow junior roles to be temporarily granted senior roles' permissions, such as PBDM, RDM2000 and ABDM. However, RDM2000 does not support multiple delegation. We have proposed a delegation model called User-to-Role Delegation Model (URDM), which is an extension of RDM2000. URDM supports multiple delegation, role hierarchy, and single-step delegation in four situations:
• Situation 1: The delegating user cannot delegate arbitrary subsets of permissions in a delegating role but can only delegate the entire role at a time to a set of delegated users, who are members of the same role before delegation.
• Situation 2: The delegating user can delegate subsets of permissions in a delegating role at a time to a set of delegated users, who are members of the same role before delegation.
• Situation 4: The delegating user can delegate subsets of permissions in a delegating role at a time to a set of delegated users, who are members of different roles before delegation. URDM also supports Grant-Dependent Revocation. We have implemented a web application called University Delegation Management System (UDMS) to illustrate the first situation.
Future work may extend our framework to support multiple step delegation and information sharing in other applications, such as healthcare systems, government, and commercial organizations. In the era of data transfer mobility, how to handle new and complex problems of mobile and distributed access to resources and information sharing will be another interesting direction to explore.
